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Abstract 
Our IT world today is facing de-perimeterisation, a term used by the Jericho 
Forum to represent the breaking down of the traditional network perimeters that 
protects an organisation’s internal network from the external threats.  This is due to 
highly connected inter-networks, proliferation of remote workers, outsourcing & 
partnership caused by changing business models and the weakening of the firewalls 
because of the numerous “holes” punched by new applications.  There is without 
doubt that de-perimeterisation is happening and it brings many threats to 
organisations.  One such organisation is a law enforcement agency which is the 
authority to fight against crime.  Equipped with high-tech equipment and using 
latest advanced systems, the law enforcement agency has relied quite heavily on IT 
to assist it in its day-to-day operations.  In face of budget constraints and with 
implementations of cost-cutting measures, the law enforcement agency is not spared 
the effects of de-perimeterisation and is also facing threats associated with de-
perimeterisation.  The understanding of these threats, analysing them and proposing 
countermeasures and recommendations to mitigate the risks are the focus of this 
study. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 De-perimeterisation (D-P) is a term mooted by the Jericho Forum which 
started off from the informal meetings of a group of global corporate CISOs in 2003.  
De-perimeterisation is basically used to describe the gradual erosion of the network 
perimeter which up till now still strongly protects an organisation’s internal network 
from the threats posed by external networks.  The breaking down of the perimeter as 
observed by the Jericho Forum is due to a number of reasons and among them is the 
changing business models driven by cost-savings which encourages remote users, 
outsourcing and partnership.  Bring along with D-P are the many threats such as 
loss of sensitive information and malicious insiders which will be further elaborated 
in the study. 
 A Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) is the department of the government 
which is responsible for maintaining law and order in a nation.  The LEA exercises 
much of its authority to carry out its duties to ensure public safety and security.  
This powerful organisation however is not spared from the effects of de-
perimeterised which we will see in this report.  Part of the objectives of this study is 
also to analyse the threats that D-P brings to a LEA and propose recommendations 
to mitigate those risks. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this report are: 
(i)  To explain the concepts of de-perimeterisation. 
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(ii)  To analyse the operational setup and environment of a law 
enforcement agency and carry out risk analysis in its facing of the 
issues with de-perimeterisation. 
(iii)  To propose practical solutions to manage the risks associated with de-
perimeterisation. 
 
1.3 Scope 
 The scope of the study generally covers de-perimeterisation and will not be 
providing an in-depth explanation on all aspects of de-perimeterisation proposed by 
the Jericho Forum.  While the law enforcement agency would be defined, it would 
only be a simplified one from the author’s knowledge and based on Internet 
resources.  Details on the intelligence and operations will be excluded due to 
sensitivity of the information.  Finally, in the risk analysis, the processes from risk 
treatment would not be carried in the absence of management decision. 
 
1.4 Organisation 
Following the introduction in this chapter, Chapter 2 will try to demystify 
the term de-perimeterisation (D-P).  It will be explained as to how D-P came about, 
what are the driving factors and the strategy proposed by the Jericho Forum.  Some 
critics about the D-P concept would also be given at the end of the chapter.  Next, 
Chapter 3 aims to define the organisation of a Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) 
where the effects of D-P will be analysed.  It will provide the organisational 
structure, the players, the assets and the network setup of the LEA.  In Chapter 4 
Risk Analysis, the threats faced by a LEA in face of de-perimeterisation will be 
identified, the risks will be assessed and analysed.  The possible countermeasures 
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against them would be proposed as well.  Having carried out risk analysis, providing 
the recommendations is the objective of Chapter 5.  Recommendations will be 
categorised into short-term, mid-term and long-term; short-term ones should be 
implemented as soon as possible while long-term recommendations are exploratory 
at this stage; mid-term recommendations will take a longer time to achieve but 
should be carried out as soon so that its full benefits could be realised in about 3 to 4 
years’ time.  Finally, the conclusions of the study will be given in Chapter 6. 
At the end of the report are the References.  A simple Risk Management 
Methodology (RMM) relevant to the risk analysis carried out in Chapter 4 is found 
in Annex A.  In Appendix A, the project description form submitted for this report is 
attached. 
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Chapter 2 
De-perimeterisation Demystified 
 
In this chapter, we will be demystifying de-perimeterisation (D-P) by 
explaining the reasons behind it, the issues surrounding it and the proposed 
approach to the “solutions” in handling it.  The purpose of the chapter is to provide 
the reader an overview of D-P so as to aid in the understanding of the subsequent 
chapters and it is not in the scope of this report to provide a complete explanation on 
all aspects of D-P. 
 
2.1 Introduction to De-perimeterisation 
 
De-perimeterisation (D-P) is a term mooted by the Jericho Forum1.  The 
Jericho Forum came about in 2003 through the informal meeting discussions of a 
group of global corporate CISOs [1].  The forum’s main objective is to create a 
blueprint for solutions to protect enterprise systems and data on multiple levels, 
using a well-defined mix of encryption, inherently secure protocols, and data-level 
authentication.  This will allow secure and cost-effective business collaboration 
through the use of the Internet. 
De-perimeterisation refers to the erosion of the network perimeter (formed 
using routers, firewalls and other network equipment) of an organization.  How it 
came about and the strategies to deal with it will be discussed in the subsequent 
sections of this chapter. 
 
                                                 
1
 Jericho Forum, http://www.jerichoforum.org/ 
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2.2 Why De-perimeterisation? 
 
 As shown in Figure 2.1, the technological advances in computer 
internetworking led by key drivers (such as outsourcing, off-shoring, low-cost 
feature-rich mobile devices, B2B & B2C integration) has slowly but effectively 
caused the breaking down of organisations’ network perimeters.   
 
Figure 2.1 Increase in network connectivity with time (extracted from Jericho Forum [2]). 
 
In the history of computing, computers have evolved from Mainframes to 
Minicomputers to Personal Computers (PCs); from standalone machines to Local 
Area Network (LAN) islands to Internet connectivity; from desktops to laptops to 
wireless devices.  In addition, organisations have changed from having office-bound 
workers to remote workers; business models have changed from having customers 
visiting shops in person to purchase goods to global customers who carry out 
purchases from the Internet.  The challenges or strains that were placed on 
traditional perimeter network architecture2 can be summarized as: 
                                                 
2
 Extracted from Royal Holloway MSc in Information Security Autumn Seminar Series 2007 “De-
Perimeterisation” delivered on 29th Nov 2007 by Andy Barlow and Darren Brooks from Accenture. 
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• Changing business model – this is where company employees started to 
move out of their offices and work as remote workers; and where business 
associates move into companies and work in these companies’ internal 
network.  Remote workers are equipped with laptops in order for them to 
have remote connections to access the company’s network resources from 
outside their offices.  The laptops, after being moved out of the company’s 
perimeterised internal network, are now subjected to the threats in untrusted 
networks, in particularly malware.  This creates the challenge of maintaining 
the laptops which is difficult but necessary to secure against threats outside 
the office’s network.  Business associates inside the company would likely 
be using the company’s network to access external resources.  This poses 
another threat to the company as it gives rise to potential points where 
viruses could spread into the company’s internal network and also for 
sensitive information to leak out of the company.  Thus, we see that the 
company’s network perimeter has virtually become impossible to define. 
• Globalisation Effect – due to the globalisation effect, applications would 
now require to be accessed from computer machines at varied locations 
crossing international boundaries through the Internet.  Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) “tunnels” are usually established so that data could be 
transmitted securely across the Internet.  This however punches “holes” 
through the firewalls making them less effective in stopping malicious 
content from entering the company’s internal network.  This has made the 
traditional network perimeter to be “porous” and ineffective in defending the 
company’s network. 
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• Change in Technology – Technology advances caused a significant 
challenge on the existing architecture.  Technology has created a growing 
use of mobile and wireless devices by an increasing “virtual” workforce; 
more services were allowed through the perimeter to have better 
accessibility to data; and many more control of non-traditional IT 
applications (such as telephony, HVAC controls, SCADA systems, video 
systems) is migrating to the Internet Protocol.  All these would create more 
“holes” in the firewalls and opens up even more vulnerable points from 
which an attack can be launched into the company’s internal network.  
Furthermore, if the attacker can successfully exploit the weakness, he could 
possibly control or cause denial of service to some of the critical systems 
used by the company. 
• Remote Access – the need for remote users’ access to corporate/private 
network over the public internet has led to the weakening of the 
organisation’s perimeter because there is a need to have firewall rules to 
allow applications to work when accessed remotely.  This will weaken the 
firewall against malicious attacks into the company’s internal network.  
Malicious content could basically bypass the firewall’s screening by going 
through the “holes” that are created.  Hence, the network perimeter which 
once protects the internal network has become useless.   
• Traffic Volume – the volume of data traffic through a corporate’s network is 
ever increasing with new applications that encourage collaborations and 
multimedia contents.  The advance in technology that increases bandwidth 
can never catch up with the explosion in the volume of traffic.  This added 
much stress on the perimeter proxies that scan traffic for malicious content. 
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• Convergence of Identity – the growth in business and accessibility has led to 
an “identity proliferation” whereby a person has disparate identities in 
disparate locations for disparate systems and in discrete access events.  It is 
therefore a great challenge to cater to the requirements of identification in 
such an environment and at the same time, maintain the perimeter.  It is 
difficult for any applications to manage and identify such a large pool of 
identities across different systems and in most cases, a more than necessary 
number of users is allowed the access to data.  As such, applications have 
caused bigger than necessary “holes” in the perimeter. 
 
According to the Jericho Forum, the erosion of the perimeter is driven by three main 
factors [3], they are: 
• Security exploits using delivery mechanisms (such as e-mail and Web) that 
transit the border, thus delivering the security exploits to the heart of an 
organisation.  Due to the ineffectiveness of most firewalls in stopping data-
driven attacks where malicious contents are embedded into emails and web 
application data, the content would basically go straight through, passing the 
perimeter and into the internal network of the organisation.  The exploit 
would then find its way to the mail or application servers and compromise 
the machines if they are vulnerable to the exploit. 
• Vendors with products that need to communicate across the border 
encapsulating their protocols within the Web protocols (using TCP/IP port 
80 or port 443).  In this way, these products have effectively bypassed the 
screening done by firewalls which would allow for Web protocols to pass 
through them.  This loophole could be used by an attacker to embed an 
exploit that goes through the perimeter via the application. 
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• The demands of businesses needing to trade using the Internet and being 
restricted by their corporate perimeter, and either punching (further) holes in 
that perimeter and/or bypassing the perimeter. 
 
De-perimeterisation is a trend that is unavoidable.  As mentioned above, 
applications that were developed to suit business needs have been punching “holes” 
through the firewalls that protect an organisation’s internal network from the 
external.  The line between internal and external networks has been blurred by 
mobile workers working from home or from a business partner’s network, and by 
outsourced staff working within the organization’s network. 
The 2008 Information Security Breaches Survey by BERR also seems to 
have supported the continuation of D-P [4].  As shown in Figure 2.2 below, the 
overall percentage of UK companies who responded that have outsourced some IT 
operations remains about the same at around 52% as compared to two years ago but 
this is still a high figure.  We can see a significant amount of 20% for large 
businesses to have outsourced some IT operations, including some off-shoring. 
 
Figure 2.2  Outsourcing and offshoring of IT operations for UK businesses3. 
 
                                                 
3
 Extracted from 2008 Information Security Breaches Survey by BERR, Figure 25 (Page 13), 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file45714.pdf. 
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The survey also indicated that 54% of the UK companies now allow 
employees to access their systems remotely (up from 36% in 2006).  In addition, the 
number of companies using wireless network had increased from 25% to 42% over 
the last two years.  There is an increase in UK companies using Instant Messaging 
(IM) and Voice over IP (VoIP) Telephony.  All these have weakened the 
effectiveness of the firewall which is regarded as de-facto perimeter defense in 
companies nowadays.  With mobility and all the “holes” in the firewall, it makes 
companies’ internal networks more vulnerable to attacks. 
Mobility in the workforce, flexibility in deployment of staff, better synergy 
between partners and cost savings are the business benefits that have directly or 
indirectly lead to de-perimeterisation.  However, the risks that de-perimeterisation 
brings include the erosion of the perimeter making it less effective against external 
attacks, the vulnerabilities faced by laptops and an increased threat from insiders.  
The D-P risks will be discussed in further details in Chapter 4 but as we can see, the 
risks to information security that de-perimeterisation brings about are as much as 
the business benefits that can be obtained.  Increasingly, information will flow 
between business organizations over shared and third-party networks, so that 
ultimately the only reliable security strategy is to protect the information itself, 
rather than the network and the IT infrastructure [5]. 
 
The Solution 
The solution as proposed by the Jericho Forum suggested that traditional 
security solutions, including firewalls, and maintaining "defence in depth", will 
continue to play vital roles, but there is a need to remain alert to how they are 
affected by new challenges, and in particular continually check that their operational 
effectiveness is not being undermined. Ultimately, in a fully de-perimeterised 
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network, every component will be independently secure, requiring systems and data 
protection on multiple levels, using a mixture of: 
• encryption  
• inherently secure communications  
• data-level authentication 
 
The Roadmap – The four phases of D-P 
In his interview with Network World, Paul Simmonds, CISO of ICI who is a 
member of the Jericho Forum Board of Management proposed a roadmap in 
which the transformation to a D-P world will come about [6] [7].  Graham 
Palmer in his interpretation of the four phases added a Phase 0 so as to show 
the transition from what we were, before moving into Phase 1 where what 
we are now. 
Phase 0 – Hard shell perimeter 
This is the typical traditional security model which all security professional 
are familiar with.  As explained by Graham, the Phase 0 model is identified 
by the data centres, systems and applications secured by virtue of their 
location in the facilities of the organisation in question. These facilities are 
owned and operated by the organisation.  Access to the resources is 
controlled firstly by location, depending on whether you are in the trusted 
part of the network or outside it.  This is achieved by managing the firewalls 
that define the perimeter of the network.  Remote access is provided using a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) by establishing a secure tunnel using IPSec 
or other means via two-factor authentication. 
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Phase 1 – Move outside the perimeter 
This phase is what is generally agreed as where most corporations are at in 
this moment.  It is characterised by the increased in mobility of the 
workforce.  Mobile workers access corporate network and resources, such as 
email through the Internet using “Internet Data Centres” by leveraging on 
the cost saving ASP model.  The whole lot of things associated with D-P 
that are happening at this phase are what have been described earlier, like 
outsourcing and changing business model towards closer partnerships.  This 
is exactly where we see the start of the erosion of the network perimeter. 
Phase 2 – Remove the harden perimeter 
Moving into the next phase, the perimeter does not change as a whole but 
the nature of it is altered.  The perimeter would become a Quality of Service 
(QoS) border in which applications predominately proprietary ones would 
more than often be penetrating through the network perimeter.  Secure 
“islands” would form through the provision of encrypted transport and 
authenticated access to internal data.  The acceptable QoS level is a business 
decision as Simmonds says. One that is driven by cost justification and 
return on investment calculations. 
Phase 3 – No perimeter 
In Phase 3, the perimeter would as it seems to be gone.  Access to internal 
data is controlled through dynamic authentication means.  Work on the 
technologies and solutions for this phase is in its infancy where security 
devices need to migrate from layer 3 to layer 7 of the OSI 7 layer model.  
They will need application awareness in order to interpret the context of the 
data they are surveying on a scale not seen presently. 
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Phase 4 – Data level encryption 
The last and final stage of the roadmap or transformation is where data level 
encryption is achieved.  As what Graham has described, the security 
provided at this phase on the data would be completely integrated such that 
data written onto a disk for example would have all its relevant security 
written down as well.  In other words, the data components on the disk will 
contain the data and the access control information, keys for encryption or 
read and write privileges. This has the effect of making all data ‘stand alone’ 
it is protected because the security parameters that will ensure it is used or 
viewed appropriately are completely central to it.  When that piece of data is 
copied to another server the parameters are copied too, nothing changes.  
Therefore, the vision at this point of time as seen by Simmonds and the 
Jericho Forum makes the network perimeter redundant. 
 
Phase 4 is truly a de-perimeterised environment.  Terry Bebbington in his 
MSc dissertation drew up his vision of a Phase 4 architecture which he called the 
“Rosetta Model” [8].  The model consists of Trusted Brokers, Filtering Utility, 
Information Providers and Data Silos.  The key benefits of the model are that it tries 
to use existing technologies and standards, and it is allows a stage approach to the 
transition into this phase.  However, Bebbington admitted that much has to be done 
for it to realise, such as having a global authentication and identification standard, a 
legal structure as well as an efficient key management system to all the 
cryptographic protocols that are in use. 
In order to move the whole environment into a de-perimeterised one, a 
number of position papers have been published by the Forum and they include one 
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on Inherently Secure Communications (ISC), Wireless, VoIP, Internet Filtering & 
Reporting, End-point Security, Enterprise Information Protection & Control (or 
DRM), Trust & Co-operation, Information Access Policy Management, etc.  These 
papers serve to gear technology vendors, standards organisations and business 
consumers towards developing products and standards, and adopting solutions that 
would ultimately resolve the D-P issue. 
 
2.3 The Eleven Commandments 
 In order to plan for a de-perimeterised future, the Jericho Forum also 
published the Jericho Forum Commandments (JFCs) that build on “good security” 
and to specifically address those areas of security that are necessary to deliver a de-
perimeterised vision.  The JFCs as depicted by the forum are categorized into 5 
areas and there are a total of 11 principles as listed below [9]:  
 
Fundamentals 
1.  The scope and level of protection should be specific & appropriate to 
the asset at risk. 
• Business demands that security enables business agility and is cost 
effective 
• Whereas boundary firewalls may continue to provide basic network 
protection, individual systems and data will need to be capable of 
protecting themselves 
• In general, it’s easier to protect an asset the closer protection is 
provided 
 
2.  Security mechanisms must be pervasive, simple, scalable & easy to 
manage. 
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• Unnecessary complexity is a threat to good security 
• Coherent security principles are required which span all tiers of the 
architecture 
• Security mechanisms must scale; from small objects to large 
objects 
• To be both simple and scalable, interoperable security “building 
blocks” need to be capable of being combined to provide the 
required security mechanisms 
 
3. Assume context at your peril. 
• Security solutions designed for one environment may not be 
transferable to work in another. Thus it is important to understand 
the limitations of any security solution 
• Problems, limitations and issues can come from a variety of 
sources, including geographic, legal, technical, acceptability of risk, 
etc. 
 
Surviving in a Hostile World 
4.  Devices and applications must communicate using open, secure 
protocols. 
• Security through obscurity is a flawed assumption - secure 
protocols demand open peer review to provide robust assessment 
and thus wide acceptance and use 
• The security requirements of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (reliability) should be assessed and built in to protocols 
as appropriate, not added-on 
• Encrypted encapsulation should only be used when appropriate and 
does not solve everything 
 
5. All devices must be capable of maintaining their security policy on an 
untrusted network. 
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• A “security policy” defines the rules with regard to the protection 
of the asset 
• Rules must be complete with respect to an arbitrary context 
• Any implementation must be capable of surviving on the raw 
Internet, e.g., will not break on any input 
 
The need for trust 
6.  All people, processes, technology must have declared and transparent 
levels of trust for any transaction to take place. 
• Trust in this context is establishing understanding between 
contracting parties to conduct a transaction and the obligations this 
assigns on each party involved 
• Trust models must encompass people/organisations and 
devices/infrastructure 
• Trust level may vary by location, transaction type, user role and 
transactional risk 
 
7.  Mutual trust assurance levels must be determinable. 
• Devices and users must be capable of appropriate levels of (mutual) 
authentication for accessing systems and data 
• Authentication and authorisation frameworks must support the trust 
model 
 
Identity, Management and Federation 
8.  Authentication, authorisation and accountability must interoperate / 
exchange outside of your locus / area of control. 
• People/systems must be able to manage permissions of resources 
and rights of users they don't control 
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• There must be capability of trusting an organisation, which can 
authenticate individuals or groups, thus eliminating the need to 
create separate identities 
• In principle, only one instance of person / system / identity may 
exist, but privacy necessitates the support for multiple instances, or 
once instance with multiple facets 
• Systems must be able to pass on security credentials /assertions 
• Multiple loci (areas) of control must be supported 
 
Access to data 
9.  Access to data should be controlled by security attributes of the data 
itself. 
• Attributes can be held within the data (DRM/Metadata) or could be a 
separate system 
• Access / security could be implemented by encryption 
• Some data may have “public, non-confidential” attributes 
• Access and access rights have a temporal component 
 
10.  Data privacy (and security of any asset of sufficiently high value) 
requires a segregation of duties/privileges. 
• Permissions, keys, privileges etc. must ultimately fall under 
independent control, or there will always be a weakest link at the 
top of the chain of trust 
• Administrator access must also be subject to these controls 
 
11.  By default, data must be appropriately secured when stored, in transit 
and in use. 
• Removing the default must be a conscious act 
• High security should not be enforced for everything; “appropriate” 
implies varying levels with potentially some data not secured at all 
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It can be observed that some of the commandments are basic and are good 
security practices, such as having appropriate protection level to assets at risk and 
“assume context at your peril” while some commandments are rather far-fetched 
goals, some of which like in data access, trust management and identity 
management are difficult to achieve in practice.  For example, access control 
(JFC#9) at the data level is an enormous task due to the huge amount of existing 
organisation data that needs to be classified and stored together with its associated 
security attributes.  And also, JFC#8 calls for identity to be exchanged outside the 
area of control and this requires a global specification standard to be written first so 
that a global identity management framework to be established among all players 
around the world before it can be realised. 
 
2.4 Critics on De-perimeterisation 
There were several critics and scepticism about de-perimeterisation.  The 
early ones criticized the Forum as about getting rid of firewalls but this is not true.  
It has been clarified by the Forum that use of firewalls is still required now (which 
is in line with JFC#1) but they would be made more redundant with time as the IT 
environment adopts D-P solutions that inherently secure data [3] [10].  Eventually, 
the Forum predicts that firewalls may become obsolete.  Other misunderstandings, 
such as that the de-perimeterisation is about developing a solution or strategy, has 
been clarified – it is not a solution and neither a strategy, it is the problem that the 
Forum is addressing [11]. 
A good discussion on the limitations of Jericho Forum’s views on D-P was 
given by Graham Palmer [6].  After listing all the benefits that the D-P vision brings, 
Graham cited existing solutions still working, huge scope of work, requirement for 
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global solutions, reliance on prediction and restriction on encryption export as the 
challenges in achieving the vision. 
Joel Synder is especially sceptical about the Forum.  He said that “At best, 
Jericho will help to raise awareness of the usefulness of a defense-in-depth network 
security strategy. More likely, the forum will end up on the scrap heap of unrealized 
ideas and wasted effort.” [12].  Snyder thinks that such large and architecturally 
elegant ideas die an ugly, lingering and expensive death, citing the public-key 
infrastructure (PKI) identities, X.400 e-mail and ATM to the desktop as examples. 
A Computer Weekly article titled “Deperimeterised approach to security is 
not suitable for everyone, warn analysts” by Bill Goodwin in April 2006 warned 
that D-P is not for everyone [13].  The report quoted Mark Waghorne, principal 
adviser at KPMG, saying that for de-perimeterisation to work, most organisations 
would need a far more mature and consistent approach to identifying and classifying 
IT assets that need protection.  He further mentioned that de-perimeterisation 
requires effective administration to secure tens of thousands of assets, rather than 
deploying a small number of assets to protect the entire network. 
Recently, Dr Geraint Price from Royal Holloway University presented the 
topic “De-perimeterisation: fact or fiction?” in the Infosecurity Europe 2008 
Conference held in London on 22nd April 2008 and he stated that the areas where D-
P will work: 
• Protection of information at all stages of the information life-cycle. 
• The support of remote workers who need to access business process from 
home or some other premises. 
• Implementation of known “good practice” and technology which has been 
missing previously. 
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Dr Price however iterated that D-P will not work or is not suitable in the following: 
• Where the device is not owned by the organisation. 
• In the far-reaching goals of the Jericho Forum, such as “anytime, anywhere” 
security. 
• Extending the data security model to “arbitrary” platforms. 
• Contract and trust negotiation “on the fly”. 
• Access Control at the content (paragraph/line) level. 
He believes that further works need to be carried out in the security management; 
the relationship between the business process and the security; and the relationship 
between the security and the business drivers. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The above discussion shows that the Jericho Forum has achieved its initial 
objectives in defining the problem and raising awareness through publications, press 
release, conferences and others.  Moving on, it is hoped that more solutions would 
be developed taking into account the D-P issue and also more involvement could be 
seen in business consumers in adopting the solutions.  In the subsequent chapters of 
this report, we will see how a typical organisation facing de-perimeterisation could 
implement some practical steps to help mitigate risks brought about by D-P. 
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Chapter 3 
Defining the Organisation 
 
In this chapter, the author would define a law enforcement agency (LEA) 
that would be used for analysis.  Defining a complex organisation such as that of a 
law enforcement agency is not practical to do in this report.  What would be given is 
a simplified view of the organisation.  Much of the information here is generalised 
based on the author’s knowledge and could be found publicly on law enforcement 
agencies’ websites [14].  The rest of the information is formulated based on the 
knowledge and experience of the author.  As for matters with regards to intelligence 
and detailed operations, they will be omitted due to their confidentiality. 
For the purpose of analysing information security threats, the organisation is 
defined with emphasis on the areas of information technology (IT) rather than the 
actual policing operation side of it.  The chapter starts by giving an overview of a 
law enforcement agency in terms of its structure, function and operations.  Then, the 
players in the organisation will be discussed.  While it is obvious that the LEA 
consists of the management and its police officers in providing policing service to 
the public, the author would also name the other players (and the roles they play) 
that would allow the analysis of the impact and risks of associated threats in face of 
de-perimeterisation.  The operating environment would be briefly mentioned.  
Following that, the assets owned by the organisation would be identified.  And 
lastly, the network setup will be drawn-up to complete the whole picture of the 
organisation for analysis. 
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3.1 Overview of a Law Enforcement Agency 
The Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) to be defined here consists of the 
Headquarters, the Regional Headquarters (RHQs) and the Specialist Units (SUs).  In 
the Headquarters, there are various so called staff departments such as the 
Operations planning, Logistics, Human Resource, Finance, IT, Public Relations, etc.  
The command or the top-management of the organisation would also be situated in 
the Headquarters.   
Distributed over various locations around the country are a few Regional 
Headquarters (RHQs).  RHQs works like a “mini” Headquarters and has its own 
resources in managing its day-to-day functions such as operations, finance, logistics 
and human resource.  Each Regional HQ has under its purview, a few 
Neighbourhood Centres and Posts located at various locations within its boundaries.  
In some way, the law enforcement agency resembles that of a large multinational 
organisation that has its operations distributed over many places around the world.  
A point to note here is that having a small police post located near to the community 
and serving to the needs of the community is the “Koban” concept developed by the 
Police Force in Japan and it is seen to be effective in fostering community 
partnership in fighting crime [15].  
The Specialist Units are like the Regional HQ but they have specialized 
functions such as coastal patrol and public order.  They themselves are also located 
at disparate locations and could operate on their own. 
From what has been described, you can see that the LEA is a matrix type of 
organisation which best suit its function.  The organisational structure can be 
represented in a chart shown in Figure 3.1 in the following page.   
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Figure 3.1  Structure of a Law Enforcement Agency. 
 
 The LEA is led by the commissioner or chief of police and assisted by 
several directors or deputy chief in the management of the agency.  In general, the 
mission of agency is to maintain law and order, to protect properties and the 
innocents, and also to prevent and deter crime so as to keep a low crime rate.   
Nowadays, most police forces4 would deploy some form of technology to 
assist them in policing.  They would at least need to maintain an emergency phone 
system to receive emergency calls from the public.  Police officers on patrol would 
usually carry a communication device that allows them to keep in contact with their 
command & control centre.  There would be a need for vehicles to allow officers a 
speedy response to incidents.  A computer data network that connects up most of the 
police buildings or establishments should not be uncommon.  In more developed 
police forces, many applications would be running on this network to support their 
                                                 
4
 The terms “law enforcement agencies” and “police forces” are used interchangeably in this report 
and are meant to be the same, even though law enforcement agencies encompass a broader scope 
than the police force and include agencies like prison services, intelligence units and those that 
operate internationally such as the Interpol. 
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day-to-day operations in terms of administration, finance, investigation, intelligence 
and others. 
 
3.2 The Players 
 The obvious players in a police force are the organisation’s top-management 
(The commissioner, commanders, directors and deputy directors) and the policemen.  
However, for the police force to function properly, there are a lot more people who 
need to be involved.  For example, outsourced vendors are required to work within 
the police force - they could be contracted cleaners, security personnel or network 
engineers.  As discussed in Section 2.2, changes in business model led to 
outsourcing resulting in the need to cater for outsiders to access an organisation’s 
internal network.  This eventually leads to de-perimeterisation.  It is evident from 
the Metropolitan Police Service’s Information, Communication and Technology 
Strategy paper that it has outsourced almost all of its ICT/IS supplies [16].  The 
author believes that outsourcing is the trend in all, if not most, of the more 
developed police forces around the world.  It was also recently reported that 
Westminster Council would be outsourcing all its IT service by 2015 [17].  
Outsourcing seems to be an unavoidable development in both public and private 
sectors.  The benefits of outsourcing are basically to harness the expertise in the 
industry and to lessen the burden of the organisation in maintaining a team of 
specialists in managing the IT systems.  
In this section, we will list the players that will be relevant in the analysis of 
the risks they bring in face of de-perimeterisation.  It focuses mainly on those who 
play direct or indirect roles in the use of IT to allow risk analysis of the information 
security threats in the next chapter.  The players are listed in Table 3.1 below. 
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Table 3.1  Players in a Law Enforcement Agency. 
Players Description 
Top Management The top management of the organisation refers to the 
commissioner or chief-of-police, his deputies, 
commanders, directors and their deputies who together to 
provide directions in the operation of the organisation.  
They are the most important people who will decide the 
acceptable organisational risks.  The group will also 
include the Chief Information Officer (CIO) or Director 
Technology or Director Information which are the 
different nomenclatures used for the person in-charge of 
ICT systems. 
Police Officers They are the actual officers trained to carry out policing 
work.  These officers could be in various schemes – some 
could be doing specialised functions such as in 
investigation, coastal patrol or riot control while others 
might be deployed to do administrative and supporting 
roles in the organisation.  To some extent, they will be 
required to use the applications and technology that are 
provided to carry out their duties. 
Middle Management These are the middle managers and team leaders who are 
in-charge of group of people in carrying out police 
functions as well as in administration and supporting 
roles.  In the technology department of the organisation, 
the managers would be involved in the design, 
specification, development, testing, rollout and 
maintenance of ICT applications and equipment. 
Associates With better corporation between police forces around the 
world, it is now common to have police associates 
attached among police organisations.  Here, associates 
could also refer to seconded personnel that are from 
another department, the higher ministry or other 
ministries from the government; these associates could be 
here for audit, for a joint project or for a job attachment.  
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Players Description 
Well, seconded personnel could also refer to police 
officers attached to external organisations; some of these 
seconded officers would need to access the network 
resources directly from the networks in the external 
organisations.  This is the current trend seen in many 
private organisations and it is certainly also a trend for 
law enforcement agencies.  And as discussed in Chapter 
2, this trend is certainly one of the reasons for de-
perimeterisation caused by opening up of firewall rules 
for officers to access network resources in their 
respective organisations. 
Outsourced Vendors Outsourced vendors are an important player here.  They 
could be contracted cleaners, security personnel or 
network engineers assisting the organisation in the 
specialised tasks.  The group of outsourced vendors who 
require special attention is the IT vendors who are 
familiar with and usually given privileged access to the 
organisation’s network.  Controls have to be put in place 
to ensure that IT vendors would be able to carry out their 
work while security of the organisation’s assets is still 
being properly protected. 
Project Officers Project officers are part of the technology department 
helping the project managers in IT projects.  Like the 
project managers, project officers would be involved in 
the design, specification, development, testing, rollout 
and maintenance of ICT applications and equipment. 
Data Centre Staff It is assumed in this report that data centre(s) – whether 
in-house managed or outsourced – exists to house the 
servers of applications used by the organisation.  
Therefore, there will be staff managing the data centre 
and ensuring that the highest availability of the 
applications.  The staff has physical access to servers and 
control the access of other personnel into the data centre 
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Players Description 
as well; they will also be monitoring all the servers and 
response to any incidents happening in the data centre.  
The system administrators are part of this team too. 
Security Guards Security guards are the personnel who guard the physical 
premises.  They provide the first line of defence against a 
fake visitor trying to sneak into police buildings. Security 
guards verify visitors’ identities and do checks on 
belongings.  These guards could be staff of the 
organisation or they could be outsourced to a security 
service provider.  It is possible that they need to access an 
IT application of the organisation where they are 
working, for example, a visitor management system that 
determines who are the authorised visitors and vehicles 
into the premise.  Thus, network access has to be given 
while controls have to be put in place to prevent abuse 
and possible access point for attacks on the organisation’s 
network. 
Public The public is whom the LEA serves.  There are several 
channels through which the public could seek services 
from the LEA.  They can call the emergency line; they 
could approach the service counter of a police station or 
post; and more so now in a de-perimeterised world, the 
public goes online to access the services provided on the 
Internet website provided by the LEA. 
Users The users of the applications in the LEA actually include 
all of the above players that have been mentioned.  They 
include of course all the employees of the LEA, the 
public which it serves, its associates and outsourced 
vendors, even the security guards could need to access 
the applications of the LEA.  For each of the players, the 
access rights to be given varies and it is important that the 
rights are correctly given. 
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Putting the players together, the simplified organisation would look like the 
one given in Figure 3.2.  As can be seen, the Technology Department is part of the 
agency led by the CIO with its Project Managers and Officers.  This department has 
some data centre staff under its purview and has also to manage the outsourced IT 
vendors.  Then, there are also the Associates and Security Guards which are 
considered outside of the organisation. 
 
Figure 3.2  Simplified Organisational Chart of a Law Enforcement Agency. 
 
3.3 The ICT Assets 
The assets of the police force are aplenty, ranging from weapons, vehicles, 
buildings to radio communication sets, and from computer servers, data centres, 
desktops, laptops to sensitive data such as criminal records to even reputation which 
is an intangible but nevertheless very important to the LEA.  Listed below would 
only be the assets that are relevant to the analysis of information security threats 
associated with de-perimeterisation. 
 
Top 
Management 
Middle 
Management 
Police 
Officers 
CIO 
Project 
Managers 
Project 
Officers 
Outsourced 
IT Vendors 
Security 
Guards 
Data Centre 
staff 
Associates 
Technology Department 
Law Enforcement Agency 
Chapter 3  Defining the Organisation 
  Page 29 
Table 3.2  ICT Assets in a Law Enforcement Agency 
Assets Description 
Laptops Laptops are usually used by senior staff of the 
organisation to have remote access or for operational 
purpose due to the mobility of laptops.  The remote 
connection to the organisation’s network resources (such 
as emails) using laptops is common in the police forces 
and in many other organisations.  These connections, 
through the use of VPN, punch “holes” into the 
organisation’s network perimeter which is one of the 
factors that has caused de-perimeterisation.  Laptops 
could also be holding sensitive information and as such, 
laptops are considered important assets that need to be 
protected. 
Sensitive data Sensitive data could include crime statistics, personal 
information, operational plans, criminal records, 
intelligence information and others.  Some data could be 
linked to national safety and security.  In police 
establishments and especially in governments, data is 
usually classified using labels such as top secret, secret, 
confidential, restricted or unrestricted so that access 
control over them can be implemented. 
Vehicles Vehicles are required for quick response to incidents.  
Nowadays, police vehicles are not only loaded with all 
sorts of equipment (for road blocks, investigation, etc), 
they are also fitted with radio communication sets, 
cameras and even mobile data terminals that links to the 
command & control centre.  When vehicles are sent to 
external contractor for repair or maintenance, steps 
should be taken to protect the equipment. 
Buildings The building is where the police operate.  It is where 
police vehicles are housed and where the armoury is.  
There could also be the command & control centre or a 
data centre is located within.  After 9/11, buildings are 
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Assets Description 
viewed to be vulnerable to attacks by terrorist using 
planes, trucks and bomb cars.  And police buildings could 
quite possibly be a good target for terrorists who would 
like to make a point and challenge against a country’s 
authority.  Insiders are more likely able to cause damage 
to this asset simply due to the physical access that 
insiders have.  
Applications Applications are necessary for the working of the police 
force.  The applications include the emergency call 
system, financial system, email system and many others. 
Some applications are critical for operations while others 
are less essential.  There has been increased reliance on 
critical applications over the years, so much so that if 
these applications fail, certain police operations might not 
be able to function at all. 
Data Centres Data centres, whether in-house managed or outsourced, 
are necessary to locate servers needed to host applications 
needed for police operations.  Sufficient security both 
physical and procedural for data centres is necessary to 
protect the servers (and the data stored within them). 
Servers Servers are where applications are hosted.  They are 
important and should be running to ensure the required 
availability of applications.  For added reliability, servers 
are sometimes configured in a high availability and high 
redundancy mode. 
Desktops Desktop computers provide access to the organisation’s 
network and thus, the applications.  The applications 
could reveal sensitive data.  As such, proper controls 
have to be put in place so that the access terminals are not 
compromised, especially in a de-perimeterised 
environment where the presence of malicious insiders is 
quite possible. 
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3.4 The Network Setup 
To complete the definition of a LEA, the network setup of the organisation 
is presented in this section.  In the following paragraphs, the network diagram of the 
LEA shown in Figure 3.3 will be elaborated.   
Firstly, as discussed in Section 3.1, the LEA is separated into many units, 
namely the Headquarters, Regional Headquarters, Police Centres/Posts and 
Specialist Units.  All these have network connections through dedicated leased 
circuit lines or digital subscriber lines (DSLs) to the core network of the LEA 
(termed as “LEA network” here onwards).  The LEA Data Centre, which houses all 
the servers and equipment needed for applications, is also connected to the LEA 
network.  It is assumed that a Backup Data Centre exists for disaster recovery 
purpose.  The Data Centres are protected from the rest of the network using 
firewalls.  The connection to the Internet is through the data centre and is controlled 
with the use of firewall as well.  IT vendors carrying out network administration or 
application maintenance would have access to the data centres. 
Most police forces in the world have an Internet website to allow the public 
to access information with regards to security and many websites provides online 
applications such as to lodge a police report or to submit a job application.  Public 
users access the LEA’s Internet website through the Internet.  The LEA’s remote 
users would also be accessing to the organisational resources through the Internet 
using VPN which creates a secure channel into LEA network. 
Associates and vendors can be situated in various locations in the LEA as 
indicated in Figure 3.3.  They might or might not be given access to the LEA 
network, depending on their job functions.  Internet access could be needed by 
associates to access their own organisations’ network resources. 
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Figure 3.3  Network setup of a Law Enforcement Agency. 
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Chapter 4 
Risk Analysis 
 
Risk analysis will be carried out in this chapter against the threats brought 
about by de-perimeterisation.  The outcome of the analysis is to develop some 
practical countermeasures against the threats.  The results will be used for the 
recommendations in the next chapter. 
 
4.1 Risk Management Methodology 
The risk management methodology (RMM) to be used in this report is a 
simple qualitative one given in Annex A.  The RMM involves carrying out Risk 
Analysis, Risk Assessment, Risk Treatment, Risk Acceptance and Risk Monitoring 
and Communication.  However, the Risk Analysis and Risk Assessment steps would 
be sufficient to meet the objectives of this report.  It is also not possible to go 
through the steps after Risk Assessment in the absence of the author’s higher 
management.   
The analysis and assessment will be focused on the risks brought about in a 
de-perimeterised environment for a law enforcement agency.  The outcome of this 
exercise would be the Risk Register (given in Section 4.4) which allows for 
recommendations to be formulated in Chapter 5. 
 
4.2 Threat Analysis 
There are several threats faced by a law enforcement agency.  From the 
assets identified in the previous chapter, the threats faced by the LEA in a de-
perimeterised environment are listed down. 
But firstly, let us understand the possible attackers on a LEA.  The LEA 
faces all kinds of attackers who could do harm to the organisation’s asset.  They 
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could be terrorists, criminals, insiders and hackers but we are only concerned in this 
study with those that operate in a de-perimeterised environment.  Terrorists for one, 
which has caused much fear to everyone after the 9/11 attack and 7/7 London 
Bombing, would still be around whether with D-P or without and as such, they will 
be excluded from the analysis.  It is however important to identify the attackers, 
know who they are, what their motivations are, so that effective countermeasures 
could be implemented against the threats that they bring.  As what Bruce Schneier 
puts it, “A system that doesn’t take attackers’ personal goals into account is much 
less likely to be secure against them.” [18].  He further warns that “If you 
mischaracterize your attackers, you are likely to misallocate your defences.  You’re 
likely to worry about nonexistent risks and ignore the real ones.  Doing so isn’t 
necessarily a disaster, but it is certainly more likely to result in one.”. 
Presented in Table 4.1 are the possible attackers in a de-perimetered 
environment.  Following that, Table 4.2 tabulated all the threats perceived by the 
author. 
Table 4.1  The Attackers. 
Attackers Description 
Malicious insiders The malicious insider has frequently been identified as 
the number one attacker or threat to an organisation, 
whether if he is in the private sector or in the 
government.  This is supported in a poll conducted by 
Qualy in association with Jericho Forum in April 2007 
revealed that 69% of European executives believe that 
insider threats pose more serious problem than threats 
from outside the organization [19]. 
Quite obviously, the main reason is that the insiders are 
the ones who have a high level of access in the 
organisation who can easily launch a successful attack 
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Attackers Description 
on the organisation.   
In Bruce Schneier’s book “Beyond Fear: Thinking 
sensibly about security in an uncertain world”, he 
mentioned that “Insiders are invariably more worrisome 
attackers than outsiders.  Yet perhaps the most common 
security mistake of all is to expend considerable effort 
combating outsiders while ignoring the insider threat.” 
[18].  He gave a few examples of insider attacks such as 
Aldrich Ames in the CIA who sold secrets to the Soviets 
KGB from 1985 to 1994 and Stanley Mark Rifkin who 
as a consultant in Security National Bank in Los 
Angeles transferred several million dollars into a Swiss 
account and converting them into diamonds. 
One of the countermeasures applied in LEAs and in 
most governments to mitigate insider threats is to carry 
out security clearance on all employees.  This is the first 
step and a vital one to prevent possible malicious 
insiders in the future.   
It is also important to note who the insiders are; other 
than disgruntled employees, an insider could also be the 
associates and the outsourced vendors which includes 
security guards, cleaners and IT vendors. 
Hackers Hackers are a nuisance to organisations in the 
cyberworld.  Whether it is simply for fun, for money or 
because of emotional hatred towards the organisation, 
hackers if able to successfully launch an attack could 
cause severe damage such as loss of availability, 
sensitive data, profit and reputation to the organisation 
concerned.  A LEA could likely be a target for hackers 
who are police haters and hackers could steal 
confidential police data or cause a Denial of Service 
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Attackers Description 
(DoS) to online police services through the use of 
Botnets5.  Disruption to the police services could be 
detrimental to the reputation of the police force. 
Malware Malware generally refer to viruses, worms, Trojans and 
spyware.  Malware are not real attackers but they too 
could have great impact on the availability of police 
services.  In the BERR’s 2008 Information Security 
Breaches Survey, it was reported that the number of UK 
companies that had a malware infection has decreased to 
14% from 35% two years ago [4].  This as explained 
could be due to better anti-virus defense, reclassification 
of minor virus infection, improvement in law 
enforcement and virus writers shifting to write stealth 
code for organised crime.  Even so, malware still remain 
a threat to all organisations as they still form a sizeable 
portion of all security breaches.  Also, there is continued 
manpower effort spent in responding to them and 
contingencies are not all that effective.  Furthermore, 
they can be used to compromise machines to increase 
the power and effectiveness of Botnets.  Hence, the 
safeguards against malware should not be let down or 
reduced.   
 
Table 4.2  Threats of a Law Enforcement Agency in a De-perimeterised Environment. 
Threats Description 
Loss of laptop A large increase in the number of mobile or remote 
workers in organisations today has indirectly led to a de-
perimeterised environment.  Mobility is achieved 
through the ubiquitous use of mobile devices, in 
particularly the laptops.  Inevitably, the threat from the 
loss of laptop has increased.   
                                                 
5
 Botnet is a short term for “robot network” and is formed by a group of compromised computers on 
the network.  It can be used by its controller to launch distributed DoS attacks. 
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Threats Description 
Based on a study sponsored by Dell in June 2008, an 
astonishing 12,000 laptops were lost per week in US 
airports [20].  Back in June 2000, it was reported that 
the Defence minister of the UK government’s laptop 
was stolen by a burglar breaking into his home [21].  
Fortunately, in the statement given by the ministry, there 
was no sensitive data stored in the laptop.  In fact, the 
UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) revealed that a total loss 
of 594 laptops from 1996 to 2002 [22].  Then in January 
2007, it was revealed in an independent audit conducted 
that FBI had a total of 160 missing (loss or stolen) 
laptops from February 2002 to September 2006 and of 
which, many could contain sensitive and classified 
information [23].  This was actually an improvement 
from 354 missing laptops for the period October 1999 to 
January 2002.  If public organisations like FBI and the 
UK government could have laptops missing, the 
situation could be worst for other organisations in the 
private sector.   
The reasons for the loss of laptops could be due to 
negligence of the user or could be because of theft by 
outsiders as well as insiders.  But what is more critical 
are in the consequences in the loss of laptops.  Laptops 
are used for remote access and if stolen, could 
potentially be used to attempt an unauthorised access 
into the organisation’s network.  In addition, stored in 
the laptops’ harddisks are data and some data could be 
classified documents related to national safety and 
security in the case of a LEA. 
To simply sum up, we can see the threat from the loss of 
laptop is real and the impact is significant.  Effort is 
needed to reduce the risk that the threat brings. 
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Threats Description 
Loss of sensitive 
information 
Loss of sensitive information has always been a threat to 
a LEA and it has become especially so in a de-
perimeterised environment.  There are many incidents 
reported recently. Following the lost of 2 computer discs 
containing records of every UK child in November 2007 
by the HM Revenue & Customs department in the UK 
[24], there are also the cases where nine NHS trusts 
losing patient data [25] and the lost of millions of L-
driver details [26], both incidents occurring in 
December 2007.  Yet another incident occurred recently 
in August 2008 where unencrypted details of 84,000 
prisoners in England and Wales stored on a computer 
memory stick was reported to be lost by a private 
contractor of the UK Home Office [27] [28]. 
Not only could information be leaked through the loss 
of laptops which was discussed above, it is also equally 
possible for information to be lost through misplaced 
documents, compromising of the network by hackers, 
virus infection, spyware and various other means. 
Both insiders and outsiders are possible culprits for the 
loss of sensitive information.  Insiders who have 
privileged access to information could intentionally or 
unintentionally leak information.  Outsiders could be a 
hacker exploiting vulnerabilities in a web-facing server 
or it could a person deploying social engineering 
techniques to obtain classified information from the 
organisation. While most organisations had already have 
policies and procedures controlling insiders’ access to 
information, the controls have often been overlooked for 
“outsiders” who are inside the organisation.  These 
“outsiders” are the contractors, vendors and even the 
cleaners and security guards. 
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Attacks on Internet website The police’s Internet website is certainly under threat by 
the attacks from hackers.  It could be a DoS attack to 
make police online services unavailable to the public or 
it could be a defacement of the website to cause an 
embarrassment to the organisation.  The latter case was 
what happened to Scotland Yard’s career website in 
February 2008 as reported by the Register [29].  Even 
though no real damage was done and the website was 
recovered quickly from its backup, the incident did 
demonstrate the vulnerability of websites. 
Firewall compromised One effect of having remote workers is that many 
“holes” need to be created through the perimeter 
firewalls in order for applications to work.  Firewalls 
nowadays are practically loaded with hundreds if not 
thousands or even more rules.  This makes it easy for 
viruses, worms or spyware to penetrate into an 
organisation’s internal network using the ports and 
services that are opened. 
Another kind of threat faced by the firewall could 
possibly be the breaking down of the firewall itself.  
With so many rules to process, the firewall inevitably 
would be overloaded.  Its efficiency would be severely 
affected and be pushed beyond its capacity eventually 
resulting in failure.  If no redundancy and high 
availability are being built into the design, all the 
applications protected behind the firewall would just 
become inaccessible to all users.  A hacker could also 
try to trigger this failure and exploit the vulnerability if 
the firewall does not have a failsafe mechanism to enter 
into the internal network. 
Vulnerabilities of mobile 
devices 
Mobile devices are in abundance these days to support 
mobile workers in a de-perimeterised world that we are 
in today.  The devices that are available in the market 
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include the laptops that are mentioned above, personal 
digital assistants (PDAs), pocket PCs, mobile phones, 
smartphones, digital cameras, video camera, game 
consoles, music players and others.  Many newly 
invented devices combine the features of a few devices, 
for example, the smartphone is used as a PDA and 
usually comes with a built-in camera.  The processing 
power, storage capacity and functionalities of these 
devices are ever increasing with time.  More and more 
devices have wireless connection capability that allows 
an unlimited access to information and applications on 
the Internet.  However, came with all these convenience 
and functionalities are the vulnerabilities that the 
devices face.  Vulnerabilities make it possible for an 
attacker to exploit the devices, deny their access to 
services or steal any stored information from them. 
Insider attacks As mentioned in Table 4.2, insiders are considered 
attackers and the harm that they can do is severe.  It is 
also usually difficult to detect an insider’s attack until it 
is too late.  The malicious insiders could basically do 
unlimited damage to an organisation – he can steal 
laptops, steal sensitive data, plant a bomb, hijack a 
police vehicle; he can cause failure of critical 
equipment; he can inject a virus into the organisation’s 
internal network; and the list of harms that an insider 
can do is non-exhaustive. 
Our discussion in Table 4.1 has explained the threat 
from insiders is aggravated in a de-perimeterised world 
where there is more number of insiders due to the 
changing business models.  The LEA is also not spared 
the effects of de-perimeterisation and its insiders could 
be an employee, associate, outsourced IT vendor, 
security guard, cleaner and anyone that has dealings 
with the LEA.  This threat can never be better 
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demonstrated by the incident mentioned in “Loss of 
sensitive information” of this table where unencrypted 
details of 84,000 prisoners in England and Wales stored 
on a computer memory stick was reported to be lost by a 
private contractor of the UK Home Office [27].  The 
harm done could be more severe than a private 
organisation due to the existence of sensitive 
information (as explained in Table 3.2 on Data).   
 
 
4.3 Countermeasures 
The Jericho Forum has raised the awareness of the issue of de-
perimeterisation (D-P) and the proposed Jericho principles as explained by the 
forum are not the solutions to D-P.  What the Jericho Forum is trying to do is to 
encourage vendors to develop applications and equipment that address the issue 
based on the Jericho commandments or principles.  While waiting for commercial 
solutions to appear, some practical countermeasures (or safeguards or controls) 
could be adopted against the threats faced in an effort to mitigate the risks.  Section 
4.2 has identified the threats to a LEA due to D-P and in this section, a list of 
possible countermeasures will be discussed. 
 Table 4.3 in the next page tabulates the countermeasures against the threats 
identified.   
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Table 4.3  Countermeasures against threats. 
Threat Countermeasures Description 
Loss of laptops 
& laptop 
vulnerabilities 
Encryption of 
laptop data 
The encryption of data on laptops is not a new 
feature but nowadays, more products with such 
feature are appearing and data encryption has 
also been made easier.  For example, Microsoft 
latest operating system Vista comes with a 
harddisk encryption feature called BitLocker 
[30] and Seagate has started shipping encrypted 
laptop hard drives [31].  By encrypting the data, 
we would effectively eliminate the risk of 
sensitive data leakage from the lost of laptops. 
Encryption is especially needed for the laptops 
of the top-management in the LEA who will 
have sensitive data which could be in the form 
of document files or emails stored on the 
laptops. 
Laptop hardening Hardening of the laptop is necessary to 
eliminate vulnerabilities.  The operating system 
of the laptop should be hardened.  The laptop 
should be installed with a personal firewall, 
intrusion detection/prevention system and anti-
virus software.  A strong password login should 
be used and, biometrics and two-factor 
authentication could be used as well.  Other than 
that, laptops could be fitted with Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) chips and make use of 
the security functions provided by the TPM.  
There should also be policies in place to ensure 
regularly patching and updating of the virus 
definition files.  All these steps make the laptop 
stronger for use by a remote user in the 
untrusted environment of the Internet. 
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Data backup Data backup is an essential safeguard to 
mitigate against loss of laptop.  Even if the 
laptop is lost, we could at least recover the data 
so that the user would suffer the least disruption. 
Loss of 
sensitive 
information 
Data encryption Data encryption is an effective countermeasure 
against loss of sensitive information.  If data is 
properly encrypted with a good encryption 
algorithm, any stolen data by an attacker would 
almost be useless to him.  Data encryption is 
what the ultimate goal of a de-perimeterised 
world as according to JFC#9.  Right now, 
encryption is used widely where confidentiality 
of data is absolutely necessary such as in online 
transactions using SSL, in the credit cards and 
in the GSM mobile system.  However, it is still 
some way to go for the industry to develop 
practical solution that can classify all data, 
encrypt the data and provide efficient access 
control over the data. 
Access control to 
data 
JFC#10 stresses the importance of access 
control to data in a de-perimeterised world to 
ensure that only the authorised personnel would 
be able to access the data.  This will prevent 
data leakage.  For this to work, data should be 
properly classified and maintained as mentioned 
in JFC#9.  However, access control at a data 
level is complex and difficult.  It is also a 
massive effort to process enormous amount of 
data and it would require global authentication 
and a global standard for Identity & Trust 
management.  Nevertheless, some form of 
access control of data still has to be 
implemented to protect sensitive information. 
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Control of data 
storage devices 
Data storage devices such as thumb drives (or 
memory sticks) and memory cards are 
ubiquitous these days.  They have high capacity 
and are very small.  Even smartphones, cameras 
and music players are capable of data storage.  
All these devices can be easily brought into an 
organisation to be used to copy out sensitive 
data, spread virus or do other damage.  But 
sadly, 67% of UK companies in BERR’s 
Information Security Breaches Survey 2008 did 
nothing to prevent confidential data leaving on 
USB sticks, etc [4].  The incident on the lost of 
computer memory stick containing unencrypted 
data of criminals in UK reported on 22nd August 
2008 proved the point on the need to control of 
the use of thumb drives [27].   
Attacks on 
Internet 
website 
Hardening of 
servers 
Attacks on Internet websites are possible if there 
are vulnerabilities on the web servers that a 
hacker can exploit.  In order to avoid this, web 
servers should be hardened and constantly 
patched to remove any vulnerabilities.  
Penetration tests should be conducted regularly 
on the web servers. 
Response and 
contingency plan 
Even if the servers are patched with the latest 
updates, it cannot be guaranteed that no attacks 
can be made on the servers.  The servers will 
still be vulnerable to “zero-day” attacks.  
Therefore, it is important that a response and 
contingency plan to be formulated to response 
to an attack.  In this way, we could be certain 
that services could be recovered in the shortest 
possible time. 
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Data backup As with the data backup for laptops, backup of 
the data on the web server is essential to reduce 
the damage of an attack on the Internet website.  
Should data be deleted from the server, the 
latest backup version of the data can be restored 
quickly. 
Firewall 
compromised 
Redundancy and 
high availability 
firewall 
In the current de-perimeterised environment, 
many “holes” are punched through the firewalls.  
And data are now usually encrypted making it 
impossible for the firewall to screen for 
malicious content.  However, as long as a truly 
de-perimeterisation has not been realised and 
practical solutions not yet been developed, the 
firewall still plays a rather important role as the 
first line of defence against attackers.  Hence, 
the design of the firewall in an organisation 
should be done carefully.  There has to be 
redundancy and high availability built into the 
firewalls.  Firewalls should also move towards 
screening at the application layer so that there 
can be better visibility of applications in order 
to suit the security requirements of the 
applications. 
Proper maintenance The firewall in the real world and a de-
perimeterised environment has huge number of 
firewall rules.  As part of the regular 
maintenance of the firewall, the rules have to be 
reviewed to see if the applications still need the 
rules so that any redundant rules can be 
removed.  If possible, rules should be regrouped 
so that they work more effectively and easier to 
be understood by the administrator.  This would 
ensure that there are as few “holes” as possible 
Chapter 4  Risk Analysis 
  Page 46 
Threat Countermeasures Description 
in the firewall and it can therefore run more 
efficiently. 
Backup recovery 
site 
For a mission critical organisation such as a 
LEA or a bank, there would be a need to have a 
backup recovery site in a setup similar to that 
mentioned in Section 3.4 and shown in Figure 
3.3.  Thus, if the firewall for the primary site has 
been compromised, the backup site could be 
brought up.  In this way, applications could still 
be made available from the backup site while 
the connection to the primary site is cut off to 
prevent further damage by the attacker. 
Vulnerability 
of mobile 
devices 
Securing mobile 
devices 
According to JFC#5, all devices must be 
capable of maintaining their security policy on 
an untrusted network.  In a de-perimeterised 
environment, mobile devices are working in 
untrusted network, and as users of these devices, 
extra attention is required to secure them. 
The different types of mobile devices in the 
market are numerous.  We should select those 
that are designed with security in mind.  In his 
article, Shlomo Touboul talked about the 
vulnerabilities of mobile devices and proposed 
that mobile security hardware (instead of 
software) be used to protect mobile devices 
[32].  One possible candidate of mobile security 
hardware is the Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM) chip which is currently under much 
research and development [33].  The TPM could 
potentially provide several security 
functionalities such as encryption and digital 
rights management.  For a LEA where mobile 
devices are to be used to store sensitive data and 
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for operations, it might even be necessary for 
devices to achieve an appropriate Evaluation 
Assurance Level (EAL) of the Common Criteria 
(CC)6. 
Policies on use of 
mobile devices 
Policies on the use of mobile devices should be 
reviewed on a regular basis.  The policies 
should be clear as to who could use the devices, 
how the devices should be used and maintained.  
The objectives are to prevent unauthorised use 
and possible abuse. 
Insider attacks Security clearance Security clearance is usually deployed in a 
government’s recruitment process where 
general background checks are conducted on a 
potential employee to ensure he or she does not 
have a negative record.  This countermeasure 
could possibly remove any potential malicious 
insiders in the future.  In the de-perimeterised 
environment, those who need to go through 
security clearance should include the 
contractors, vendors, associates, security guards 
and all others who will be “inside” the 
organisation and possibly have access to its 
assets. 
Separation of duties 
/ Principle of least 
privilege 
Separation of duties and principle of least 
privilege are what being depicted in JFC#10 
with the purpose of controlling access to data.  
It is an absolutely essential countermeasure to 
prevent or to limit the damage that a malicious 
insider can do by ensuring that no single person 
has full access and that the person has access to 
                                                 
6
 Common Criteria (CC) is a security evaluation of computer systems to provide assurance that the 
process of specification, implementation and evaluation of a computer security product has been 
conducted in a rigorous and standard manner.  For more information, please see 
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/ or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Criteria. 
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only the data he or she is authorised.  This step 
is even more so important in a LEA where there 
exists a lot of confidential information related to 
public safety and security. 
Deployment and 
active monitoring 
of IDS 
The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
complements the firewall in the protection of 
the internal network.  It helps to detect any 
abnormal activities in the network such as 
unauthorised login, unauthorised access to data 
or sudden surge in network traffic.  A feature of 
the IDS allows timely alert will be sent to the 
administrator to response to the anomaly. 
Malware Hardening of 
servers, desktops 
and laptops 
Malware takes advantage of the vulnerabilities 
that exist in servers, desktops and laptops to 
compromise the machines.  D-P has made it 
easier for malware to get into an organisation’s 
internal network through the “holes” created in 
the firewalls.  Wireless connections also make it 
possible for malware to bypass the firewalls and 
other network perimeter devices.   
An effective way of reducing this risk is to 
harden the machines commonly done by 
installing the latest software patches, removing 
unwanted services, updating the virus definition 
files and by having a host-based IDS. 
Secure coding 
practises 
Malware attacks software vulnerabilities such as 
buffer overflow.  By ensuring developers follow 
secure coding practises or by acquiring software 
that has security built into its development 
lifecycle, we can get some assurance that the 
software when in use would less likely to have 
bugs that will be exploited by a hacker.  In the 
untrusted D-P world, secure software would be 
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able to better survive against malware. 
Deployment and 
active monitoring 
of IDS 
Deployment of IDS would help to quickly 
detect an intrusion by malware.  It is usually a 
combination of host-based and network-based 
IDS that would be most effective in deterring 
malware.  The IDS system has to be actively 
monitored for the protection of the network. 
 
4.4 Risk Register 
The Risk Register based on the template given in Annex A is presented in 
this section.  However, the columns that are not relevant to this study have been 
removed.  The ratings are entered based on the author’s research of the threats in the 
current but evolving de-perimeterised environment.  The author will justify the 
ratings given for risks that are of interest and discuss the effectiveness of the 
corresponding mitigating actions. 
 
Table 4.4  The Risk Register. 
S/N Risk Statement Possible Consequences Likelihood Severity Grade Mitigation Actions 
1 
Loss of 
laptops & 
laptop 
vulnerabilities 
Loss of sensitive 
information; loss 
of reputation 
Medium 1 B 
Encryption of 
laptop data; 
laptop 
hardening; data 
backup 
2 
Loss of 
sensitive 
information 
Loss of 
reputation; 
leakage of 
operational & 
business plans; 
law suites 
Medium 1 B 
Data encryption; 
access control to 
data; control of 
data storage 
devices 
3 
Attacks on 
Internet 
website 
Unavailability of 
online services; 
website defaced 
Medium 2 C 
Hardening of 
servers; 
response & 
contingency 
plan; data 
backup 
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4 Firewall 
compromised 
Unavailability of 
services Medium 1 B 
Redundancy & 
high availability 
firewall; proper 
maintenance; 
backup recovery 
site 
5 
Vulnerability 
of mobile 
devices 
Loss of sensitive 
information High 1 A 
Securing mobile 
devices; policies 
on use 
6 Insider 
attacks 
Loss/damage of 
sensitive 
information, 
equipment & 
other assets; 
virus infection; 
unavailability of 
services 
Medium 1 B 
Security 
clearance; 
separation of 
duties/principle 
of least privilege; 
deployment & 
active monitoring 
of IDS 
7 Malware infection 
Unavailability of 
services Medium 2 C 
Hardening of 
servers, 
desktops & 
laptops; secure 
coding practises; 
deployment & 
active monitoring 
of IDS 
 
We can observe from Table 4.4 that the greatest risk faced with D-P is in the 
securing of mobile devices.  This is mainly due to the liberalisation of mobile 
devices in a de-perimeterised world which we have touched on in the previous 
sections.  At the moment, laptops are considered the most vulnerable of all mobile 
devices.  Not only are laptops lost in private organisations, we could also see loss of 
laptops occurring in government organisations such as in the cases of FBI or UK 
government and let alone a LEA.  The loss of laptop in a LEA where laptops are 
often used to store confidential information or be deployed for operations, the 
impact would certainly be severe.  In the worst case scenario, national safely and 
security could be affected possibly resulting in the loss of lives.  For the same 
reason, a compromised laptop would have severe consequences due to the leak of 
sensitive information.  As such, based on Table A.1 in Annex A, it is justifiable to 
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give the highest severity rating of ‘1’ for the loss of laptops.  However, the 
likelihood on the loss of laptops is given a rating of ‘Medium’ and not ‘High’.  It is 
a fair assumption made by the author because even though it is more common to see 
loss of laptops from the many examples cited in this report, controls are usually put 
in placed to manage the laptops especially in the case of a LEA who understands 
threats better than any other types of organisations.  Extra care should have been 
taken to ensure accountability of laptops.    The mitigating action of encrypting 
laptop data would reduce the impact of loss of sensitive information due to the loss 
of laptops to a minimum.  Well, it is arguable that there could still be some chance 
that information could be leaked as encryption is not perfect and cryptanalysts could 
possibly break them given sufficient resources.  However, this possibility is very 
low and would not be considered as part of this study.  Next, the hardening of 
laptops as discussed in the previous section would make laptops more robust; its 
effectiveness nevertheless depends on the how the laptops are being managed such 
as whether if virus definition has been updated regularly? Whether if applications 
have been patched regularly?  And whether usage of laptop and password policies 
have been strictly adhered to.  Lastly, data backup reduces the loss of availability of 
data to the user and also limits the amount of data loss.  The restoration of data 
would only be as updated as the last backup and this means that the user would still 
suffer some loss of the recent data; this is unfortunately unavoidable or would be 
very expensive to implement a “zero” loss of data. 
Other mobile devices (such as mobile phones and PDAs) unlike laptops 
however, have just only passed their infant stage of developments in terms of 
security.  Even though there are many recent ongoing researches on mobile security, 
less emphasis was previously placed in the security of these devices and therefore, 
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the likelihood that a vulnerability be exploited is still very high.  The physical 
vulnerability of the devices been stolen is itself a threat as we can see, for example, 
from the ever-increasing of mobile phones being reported missing; it was reported 
in November 2004 that more than 10,000 phones are lost or stolen every month in 
the UK [34].  Hence the rating of ‘High’ is given in the Risk Register for the 
vulnerability of mobile device being exploited resulting in loss of sensitive 
information stored on the device.  The severity level is ‘1’ due to the consequences 
of loss of sensitive information for the LEA and therefore, the outcome is a risk 
level of ‘A’.  The high risk level necessitates for special attention to be given and 
this we will be addressed in the next chapter on recommendations. 
Another high risk area is that of the insiders and as mentioned in previous 
sections, insiders include contractors, cleaners, security guards, associates and 
others who have dealings with the organisation.  Insiders could do much harm to the 
organisation due to the privileged access that they have and therefore, a severity 
level of ‘1’ is given.  The risk is tagged with a likelihood of ‘Medium’; this is 
reasonable because most government departments in particularly the LEA would 
have implemented controls such as procedures for security clearance of personnel 
that have dealings with the LEA.  It is also likely in a LEA that you will see 
employment of separation of duties, principle of least privilege or some other 
“check and balance” procedures in the handling of restricted items such as weapons, 
communications sets, etc.  As such, it is more difficult and there is less chance for a 
malicious insider to do harm.  Nevertheless, it is still a ‘Medium’ likelihood and not 
an absolutely ‘Low’ as D-P has increased the number of associates and so called 
“insiders” brought about by outsourcing, partnership and collaboration.  Other than, 
security clearance, separation of duties and principle of least privilege, the 
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mitigating action of deploying an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) or prevention 
system could be used to give alerts of any anomaly.  This to some extend restricts 
the amount of damage that an attacker can do.  The limitations of such a 
technological solution however are that such systems could be fooled by a clever 
malicious insider and also, if not properly managed and monitored, the systems are 
of no use. 
Looking at Table 4.4 again, you will notice that 2 out of the 7 identified 
threats are given the severity rating of ‘2’ while the rest have ‘1’.  The two threats 
are Attacks on Internet websites and Malware infection.  These two threats are still 
of concern to organisations but over the years, better written software and more 
effective antivirus applications had been able to put the threats under control.  The 
harm or impact that the threats can do has been narrowed.  As such, the severity 
posed by these risks warrants a ‘2’ and not ‘1’.  In fact, both risks also have been 
given ‘Medium’ likelihood and the risk level of both risks are ‘C’. 
The mitigating actions proposed against firewall being compromised are 
redundancy & high availability firewall, proper maintenance and having a backup 
recovery site.  All these, if properly implemented, would be effective in preventing 
the firewall from being compromised in a de-perimeterised environment.  As 
mentioned previously, before better solutions tailored to a D-P world appear, the 
firewall is still an important device that provides the first line of defence against 
external threats. 
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Chapter 5 
Recommendations 
 
The recommendations given in this chapter are partly based on the results of 
risk analysis done in Chapter 4.  They are also based on the author’s knowledge and 
experience in the IT industry, his understanding, interpretation and idea of de-
perimeterisation through the research that he has done on the topic.  
These recommendations are categorised into short-term, mid-term and long-
term.  Short-term recommendations are those that should be carried out immediately 
and could be achieved within 1 year or so.  It is hoped that the implementation of 
short-term recommendations would mitigate to a large extend the immediate threats 
brought about by de-perimeterisation.  Mid-term recommendations are the ones 
which require a longer time, say from 2 to 3 years to achieve.  Nevertheless, work 
has to be carried out early so that it will be possible to realise the goals of mid-term 
recommendations.  On the other hand, long-term recommendations are exploratory.  
Solutions for long-term recommendations might not yet exist or are experimental or 
are not mature enough to be deployed at an enterprise level.  It is however a wise 
idea to keep a lookout on the technologies developed in these areas within a 4 to 5 
years’ time frame. 
The chapter ends with a discussion on the essential recommendations 
specifically for a LEA and how secure would the LEA be if some or all the 
recommendations are followed. 
 
5.1 Short-term Recommendations 
 The short-term recommendations are: 
• Securing of mobile devices 
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• Vulnerability management 
• Review and tighten controls on insiders 
• Strengthen security awareness and training 
 
Securing of mobile devices 
It was evident from the risk analysis in Chapter 4 that one of the biggest 
priorities and the immediate task to mitigate risks in face of D-P is in the securing of 
mobile devices.  In order to secure mobile devices, we need the devices to have anti-
virus & intrusion detection applications, personal firewalls, hardened OS, data 
encryption functions, strong password access control, biometrics access, two-factor 
authentication, CC certified and many more.  For laptops and other devices with 
storage capacity, physical access control is important to prevent lost by simple theft 
and also to minimise the loss after losing them.  Currently, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, 
Toshiba, Dell or Samsung have already started shipping some of their laptop models 
fitted with TPM chips that could provide some security feature to make laptops 
more secure [33].  But unfortunately, the functionality offered by the chip is limited 
at this moment.  However in the future, all mobile devices could possibly be fitted 
with Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chips that could give assurance that the 
running application software is genuine and the machines themselves cannot be 
easily compromised.  All these countermeasures together with proper policies and 
adherence to best practises in managing the pool of mobile devices in the 
organisation would definitely reduce the risk to the minimum. 
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Vulnerability Management 
Vulnerability Management (VM) is another short-term measure that will 
help to mitigate the risks brought about by de-perimeterisation.  With effective VM, 
we can have an automated means to get rid of the vulnerabilities that exist in all the 
machines of the organisation. 
However, care has to be taken in the implementation of VM.  It is important 
to note that VM is not all about patching and is not only a technical solution; VM is 
a whole management process.  According to Gartner analysts, "the vulnerability 
management process includes policy definition, environment baselining, 
prioritization, shielding, mitigation as well as maintenance and monitoring." [35]. 
As how Anton Chuvakin explains, the vulnerability management process starts from 
a policy definition document that covers an organization's assets (such as systems 
and applications) and their users [36].  Such a document and the accompanying 
security procedures should define the scope of the vulnerability management effort 
as well as postulate a "known good" state of those IT resources.  Chuvakin further 
added that even if you patch all the known software vulnerabilities, you can still be 
attacked and compromised by intruders who exploit undisclosed flaws.  He stressed 
that “… apart from a sensible vulnerability management program and careful 
network and host security monitoring that might make you aware that you've been 
hit, you need to make sure that the incident response plans are in order. … to be 
addressed by using the principle of "defense in depth" during the security 
infrastructure design. Get your incident management program organized ….”.   
Hence, we can see that with a properly implemented vulnerability management 
programme, we can gain assurance that all devices (especially the mobile ones) will 
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be free from vulnerabilities and also ensure a working framework that allows the 
continuous monitoring of vulnerabilities against the ever evolving threats. 
 
Review and tighten controls on insiders 
With de-perimeterisation, it is timely to review and tighten the controls on 
insiders.  As insiders pose a big threat with potential serious damage that they can 
do in an organisation, considerations have to be carefully made when determining 
the access rights that each insider has.  Some proven principles such as separation of 
duties and principle of least privilege should be applied where necessary.  The use 
of technology such as the IDS could be applied here to alert the administrator of 
possible unauthorised access, policy violation and other anomalies.  Lastly, policies, 
procedures and controls should be reviewed to ensure they are keep updated to the 
changes and needs in the de-perimeterised environment. 
 
Strengthen security awareness and training 
People are often viewed as the weakest link in security.  But Bruce Schneier 
has pointed out that people could also be the most effective defence mechanism 
against threats [18].  In areas where technology has not reached the level to allow 
machines to work effectively without human intervention such as in identification, 
people would be more superior and more resilient against attackers who try to 
deceive the machine or a computer security system.  Therefore, in order to remove 
people from becoming the weakest link in security and at the same time harness the 
capabilities of people, security awareness and training is of utmost importance.  
New employees should be instilled with a sense of security.  And existing 
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employees are to be reminded of the security policies, procedures and the D-P 
threats that loom within the organisation, especially those associated with insiders.   
 
5.2 Mid-term Recommendations 
There are two mid-term recommendations to confront the threats of D-P, 
namely adoption of Web Services and working towards SSO.  They should be 
carried out now and be incorporated into the new applications developed for the 
organisation. 
 
Adoption of Web Services 
XML or Extensible Markup Language is a meta-language which defines a 
set of rules or syntax to describe the elements in a XML document.  Web Services 
(WS) use XML and it is an open standard.  Applications using web services would 
be highly scalable and would allow for interoperability.  Interoperability is a 
desirable property in a de-perimeterised environment where network perimeter is 
blurred between internal and external networks.  Within the web services, there is a 
list of WS security components being defined.  These components include XML 
Signature, XML Encryption and SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) 
which provides integrity, confidentiality and authentication services respectively.  
Web Services is a likely candidate as the universal standard to be used in a de-
perimeterised world as it is an open, secure standard (meeting requirements of 
JFC#4), allows data encryption (JFC#9), is flexible (JFC#1), scalable (JFC#2) and it 
allows interoperability between different systems.  Identity Management and 
Federation is also possible as accordance to the requirements of JFC#8 by using 
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web services; this is in the case of Liberty Alliance7 which is used as a Single Signed 
On (SSO) identity management scheme.  SSO will be discussed shortly.  Do 
however bear in mind that web services also has some shortcomings such as the 
overheads and inefficiencies, and it requires careful specification of all the elements 
and attributes in XML documents for interoperability.  Hence, it will take a little 
longer before it can be more widely accepted. 
 
Work towards Single Signed On (SSO) 
Single Signed On (SSO) allows a user to login once into a system and be 
able to use various services provided by different applications without having to 
login again.  It allows identity management which is necessary in a de-perimeterised 
environment.  With SSO, it is hoped that we would be better able to manage users 
having multiple identities at varied locations, and from there, controlling the data 
access of the users would be possible.   
While there has not been a SSO standard been defined, the Liberty Alliance 
project mentioned earlier has much potential to be one.  Liberty Alliance is an 
industry consortium formed in 2001 by global companies which includes British 
Telecoms, Intel, Sun Microsystems, Oracle, Novell, Computer Associates and many 
more.  The main goal of Liberty Alliance is to establish open specifications that 
support a range of network identity based interactions, and give business a basis for 
new revenue opportunities building upon existing relationships with consumers and 
                                                 
7
 Liberty Alliance project is an industry consortium. It has produced a series of specifications 
designed to support the notion of federated network identity (http://www.projectliberty.org). 
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partners, and a framework that gives consumers choice, convenience and control 
when using any Internet-connected device8. 
Even though there is currently no standard specification for SSO, the 
availability of SSO solutions in the market is not lacking.  It is important for an 
organisation to implement an SSO solution so that new applications being 
developed can be incorporated onto it.  This would be a more effective way of 
managing identities in a de-perimeterised environment and allow possibility for an 
easier future integration or migration into a truly global identity & trust 
management system. 
 
5.3 Long-term Recommendations 
As part of the long-term goal in solving de-perimeterisation, organisations 
should keep a constant lookout for the latest development of commercial products 
that meet the Jericho principles.  The areas to lookout for are in Identity and Trust 
Management and in Trusted Computing. 
 
Lookout for Identity and Trust Management  
 Global Identity and Trust Management is difficult to achieve.  It requires 
new standards to be written and solution has to be implemented on a global scale for 
it to work.  For a truly de-perimeterised environment, a global identity and trust 
management framework is needed as depicted in JFC#8.  The Infocomm 
Development Authority of Singapore (IDA) has in 2005 announced an Infocomm 
Security Masterplan which includes a National Trust Framework (NTF) 
conceptualised in 2006.  NTF’s objective is to develop a national framework that 
                                                 
8
 Extracted from “Applications & Business Security Development: Identity Management” lecture 
notes (Pg 29) by Allan Tomlinson, Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of 
London, 2008. 
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provides greater assurance and trust, so that Singapore can continue to leverage on 
its infocomm successes [37].  This is an example of an identity & trust management 
framework implemented on a national scale.  Certainly, it would be interesting to 
follow-up to see the solutions that would evolve in the near future and hopefully, the 
solutions turns out as what was perceived in the Jericho principles.  
 
Trusted Computing 
 The other area to pay close attention to is in Trusted Computing.  With 
Trusted Computing, the computer will consistently behave in specific ways, and 
those behaviors will be enforced by hardware and software [38].  Trusted 
Computing which is led by the Trusted Computing Group9 is currently under much 
development.  The group aims to develop standard specifications for a Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) to be fitted onto every mobile device.  The TPM, which 
has several security functionalities such as encryption, can be used in the areas of 
digital rights management, identity theft protection, and protection from viruses & 
spyware.  Trusted Computing can potentially help to make millions of mobile 
devices secure by protecting the devices from malware and from hackers’ attacks.  
It thus meets Jericho principles JFC#4 & #5 where devices would be robust enough 
to operate in an untrusted network using open source, secure protocols.  As 
mentioned previously in this report, various brands of laptop models were already 
been shipped with the TPM chips even though the full functionalities of the chip 
have not yet been utilised.  Soon, we could see the chip being fitted onto mobile 
phones and many other mobile devices. 
 
                                                 
9
 https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/home 
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5.4 LEA and the Recommendations  
In this section, we will discuss the proposed recommendations in relation 
with the environment of a LEA.  What are the recommendations that are essential to 
the LEA?  And if some or all the recommendations are followed, how secure would 
the LEA be? 
We could see that all the short-term recommendations (securing mobile 
devices, vulnerability management, review and tighten controls on insiders, and 
strengthen security awareness and training) are important for adoption by the LEA 
as a quick-fix solution in face of de-perimeterisation.  We have emphasized many 
times in this report the importance of securing mobile devices and this has to be 
stressed even more so for a LEA which has been deploying mobile devices, which 
are likely to contain sensitive information, for its remote workers and for use during 
operations in the field.  The threats to mobile devices in the de-perimeterised world 
are real and we have cited incidents of laptops that were lost in even the perceived 
secure environment of government departments.  So, the recommendations such as 
data encryption, hardening and others should be fully implemented to avoid loss of 
mobile devices, loss of sensitive information and likely the embarrassment to the 
LEA.   
Vulnerability management would help LEA in the same way as other 
organisations.  If done properly, it would help the LEA in keeping track of the 
threats against its assets – not only IT assets but also other assets such as weapons, 
vehicles and buildings.  Putting checks on insiders, preventing and deterring 
possible malicious insiders are what LEA have been doing well all these while.  
With de-perimeterisation, the LEA should continue its practices, and review and 
maybe step-up the controls on insiders so as to eliminate any possible over-sights.   
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The LEA is in the business of security but it should never be over-
complacent in managing security and take security for granted.  Security awareness 
and training should always be emphasized so that a culture sense of security can be 
developed for new and existing employees in the LEA. 
As the core function of a LEA is to fight crime and not in the development 
of IT solutions, it is a user of technology and as a user, the LEA could state what it 
wants or dictate its requirements for solutions to be deployed.  Hence, following the 
mid-term recommendations, the LEA should insist on Web Services and Single 
Signed On solutions from its vendors supporting its application development.  This 
would automatically gear the LEA towards preparing itself and seamlessly integrate 
itself with the de-perimeterised solutions in the near future. 
As for the long-term recommendations, they are not quite essential for the 
LEA to follow closely.  As a user of technology, the LEA is very much dependent 
on its vendors to provide the solutions that meet its requirements.  Technology is 
developing very quickly and there is much uncertainty on how some technologies 
will advance in the future.  Furthermore, the LEA would most likely be part of the 
overall IT security plan or program of the government; the IT security program 
being led by the authority in the government that handles ICT developments.  
Nevertheless, the LEA should at least keep itself updated on the latest development 
news of D-P. 
In summary, the author thinks that the short-term recommendations are all 
essential for the LEA to mitigate D-P threats.  The LEA would definitely be more 
secure in terms of preventing loss of mobile devices, loss of sensitive information, 
insider attacks and any other forms of security breaches, and be significantly 
strengthened in managing of its IT assets in face of D-P if all short-term 
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recommendations are followed.  The LEA can state what it wants for the mid-term 
recommendations to better prepare and adapt itself for the increasing effects of D-P 
in the near future.  The long-term recommendations, however, are of less 
importance to the LEA at this moment.  The LEA could however keep itself updated 
on the latest development in D-P to gear itself towards the truly de-perimeterised 
world of the future. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 
The issues that de-perimeterisation (D-P) brings are real and it is happening 
right now in organisations all over the world.  In this report, we have demystified 
the term “de-perimeterisation” by explaining how it came about, what are the 
driving factors, the issues it brings and the strategy to developing and adopting 
solutions that could confront it.   
De-perimeterisation came about basically due to the highly inter-connect 
networks we have today which encouraged a burst of mobile workers driven by the 
cost-saving considerations.  Changing business models have also led to more 
outsourcing, off-shoring and partnerships between companies and organisations.  In 
order for mobile workers to work efficiently and effectively at home or at remote 
locations, applications started to punch “holes” through the firewalls defining the 
traditional network perimeter.  With this, the firewalls are weakened and the 
network perimeter now becomes “porous”.  This perimeter is seen to have “eroded”, 
and thus the term “de-perimeterisation”.  The Jericho Forum who invented the term 
de-perimeterisation has published among its vision and position papers, a set of 
eleven Jericho commandments or principles which set the strategy in developing 
solutions that could confront the threats in a de-perimeterised world.  Part of the 
strategy is to develop solutions that use encryption, inherently secure 
communication and data-level authentication. 
From our understanding of de-perimeterisation, we have identified the 
threats that it carries.  The threats, for example, could come from a hacker who tries 
to compromise the weakened firewall in a de-perimeterised organisation.  Following 
analysis of the threats, the author concludes that security of mobile devices and 
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malicious insiders are the two biggest risks faced.  Mobile devices provide access to 
an organisation’s network and with the proliferation of mobile devices due to a large 
increase in mobile workers, these devices now face increased threats such as theft 
and malware attacks.  Malicious insiders who have privileged access within the 
organisation are also a threat to the organisation. 
Unfortunately, we are still not yet ready for a truly de-perimeterised 
environment.  There are still many hurdles to overcome before practical solutions 
could be made commercially available and be widely adopted at the enterprise level.  
Among the hurdles are things like data-level authentication and global identity & 
trust management.  While waiting for that to happen, organisations must do 
something to mitigate the risks.  The recommendations given in this report is 
specifically aimed at this.  Firstly, short-term recommendations are intended to 
mitigate the most serious D-P threats that currently exist in organisations.  These 
recommendations include the securing of mobile devices and implementing 
vulnerability management.  Then, the mid-term recommendations’ objective is to 
mould the IT environment of the organisation into an open, scalable and 
interoperable architecture such that it is able to easily adopt D-P solutions in the 
future.  Using Web Services and having SSO solutions are the proposed mid-term 
recommendations.  Lastly, the long-term recommendations keep the focus of the 
organisation in areas where new developments could possibly help organisations 
move towards a truly de-perimeterised world and be completely protected from D-P 
threats.  Identity & Trust Management and Trusted Computing are two such areas 
that have been identified.  We have also discussed that all short-term 
recommendations are essential to the LEA while the LEA as a user of technology 
can state its requirements for mid-term recommendations.  Long-term 
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recommendations however are not really important for the LEA at this moment.  
But, the LEA should keep itself updated on the latest development of D-P. 
 
Differences between a LEA and a Private Organisation 
It is appropriate here to mention the differences between a LEA and a 
private organisation in face of de-perimeterisation.  In fact, there are not many 
differences that we can see from an IT perspective.  The LEA is very much like a 
multinational corporation with its offices distributed around the world – the LEA 
has its regional headquarters distributed across the country.  Both organisations rely 
to a large extent on IT systems and technologies for their day-to-day operations; 
they are faced with pressures to remain cost effective to be competitive and efficient.  
The LEA, like a private organisation, is also constantly seeking better co-operations 
and partnerships with its counterparts to enhance its operational efficiency.  Hence, 
the effects and threats that D-P brings to a private organisation would also be felt by 
a LEA.  
However, the two entities defer in some subtle areas.  Firstly, in their 
business objectives, the LEA unlike a private organisation is not profit-oriented but 
aims to provide law and order in a country.  The motivation of attackers for the two 
organisations is also different.  A hacker is more likely to attack a private 
organisation for money while an attack on a LEA is more due to an emotional 
hatred.  The reputation for a LEA is comparatively more important than the private 
organisation as the loss of reputation would potentially cause a total distrust in 
public order system which may result in a chaotic society.  In face of de-
perimeterisation, a LEA also has a greater responsibility in terms of protecting data 
because the consequences of leakage of sensitive information, unlike a private 
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organisation which probably result in the loss of profit, that in a LEA could affect 
public safety and security, and possibly could lead to the loss of lives. 
 
Areas for further studies 
De-perimeterisation is currently a widely talked about topic where 
development of its solutions are still evolving.  There are areas related to de-
perimeterisation that do not fall within the scope of this study and are therefore not 
covered in this report.  Here is what the author believes would be of interest for 
further studies: 
• Identity & Trust Management for De-perimeterisation 
• The Legal Aspects in a De-perimeterised World 
• Architecture for a De-perimeterised Environment 
 Identity & Trust Management has been mentioned a few times in this report 
and this essential thing for de-perimeterisation is a good area to research into to see 
the effects, and how identity and trust can be managed with de-perimeterisation.  
Next, the legal aspects in a de-perimeterised world is least talked about.  A study 
into it could potentially provide an insight into the various legal issues brought 
about by de-perimeterisation.  And lastly, the architecture for a de-perimeterised 
environment is listed as an area of further studies.  While the Jericho Forum has 
published a position paper for the architecture of a de-perimeterised architecture 
which favours a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA), a de-centralised trust 
framework and P2P applications based, it still leaves much room to define a more 
concrete architecture and to explore on how the architecture could work with real 
world application scenarios [39]. 
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Final remarks 
De-perimeterisation involves a paradigm shift on the way security 
professional view the network security of organisations.  De-perimeterisation affects 
both a LEA and a private organisation in the same way.  Much has been talked 
about in this report that organisations have to carry out the risk management 
processes to confront the threats that de-perimeterisation brings.  While existing 
security solutions still work, it will not be long for organisations who do not prepare 
for de-perimeterisation to find themselves caught off-guard and be thrown into the 
need to carry out costly and disruptive overhaul of their whole network architecture.  
In order to fully embrace de-perimeterisation into our network, there is a need to 
make changes now to eliminate the problems of the future.  What will be the future 
of network security be like?  And how powerful will be the network security 
components in a de-perimeterised network architecture?  The answer, as what David 
Lacey, the founder of Jericho Forum puts it, “Only one thing seems certain: It will 
be different from today.” [40]. 
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Annex A 
Risk Management Methodology (RMM) 
 
The number of different risk management standards is aplenty.  Examples 
include the NIST’s Special Publication 800-30 (2002) “Risk Management Guide for 
Technology Systems” and the ISO 27005:2008 standard on Information Security 
Risk Management.  In this Annex, a simple qualitative Risk Management 
Methodology (RMM) would be given and be used in this report.  The flowchart 
depicting the processes in risk management is as shown in Figure A.1 below. 
 
 
Figure A.1  Risk Management Process Flow 
 
In Risk Analysis, Asset Identification & Valuation, Threat Identification and 
Vulnerability Identification would be carried out.  Threats and Vulnerabilities would 
also be defined. 
 
Risk Assessment involves using a methodology in evaluating risks.  It 
encompasses Likelihood Analysis and Impact Analysis used to determine the Risk 
Levels of all the risks associated with the assets.  Controls which are currently in 
Risk Analysis 
-  Asset Identification 
& Evaluation  
-  Threat Identification 
 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Treatment 
Risk Acceptance 
Risk Monitoring and 
Communication 
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place and further controls if needed to reduce the Risk Levels would be 
recommended in the assessment report.  Table A.1 below defines the severity of the 
risks identified based on their impact.  Subsequently, the risk level will be 
determined from Table A.2 which is computed from the impact (or severity) and 
probability (or likelihood) of the threats to the assets. 
 
Table A.1  Definition of Risk Severity10 
Description of Risk Severity Severity 
The risk, once realized, will result in 
 Highly costly loss of major tangible assets or resources; 
 significantly violate, harm, or impede an organisation’s mission, 
reputation, or interest; or 
 result in human death or serious injury. 
 
1 
The risk, once realized, will result in 
 Costly loss of major tangible assets or resources; 
 violate, harm, or impede an organisation’s mission, reputation, or 
interest; or 
 result in human injury. 
 
2 
The risk, once realized, will result in  
 Loss of major tangible assets or resources; or 
 noticeably effect an organisation’s mission, reputation, or interest. 3 
 
Table A.2  Determination of Risk Level 
 Risk Level 
Probability 
Severity 
Low Medium High 
1 C B A 
2 D C B 
3 E D C 
 
All the risks would be collated into a risk register which form part of the risk 
assessment report.  The risk register and an example are shown in Table A.3 and 
Table A.4 respectively. 
                                                 
10
 Adopted from NIST SP 800-30 (2002). 
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Table A.3  Risk Register 
S/N Risk 
Statement 
Consequences Likelihood Severity Grade Change 
Since Last 
Assessment 
Mitigation 
Actions 
Action 
Party 
Status of 
Risk 
Mitigation 
Actions 
                    
                    
                    
 
Table A.4  Example of Risk Register 
 
 
The risk assessment report would be presented to the management for Risk 
Treatment where management decisions to accept, avoid, transfer or mitigate risks 
are made.  Control actions to be taken to mitigate risks would be prioritized and 
thereafter implemented.  Any residual risks would then be made known. 
 
Risk Monitoring & Communication is about monitoring the risks that have 
been identified as well as measuring the effectiveness of the controls that are put in 
place.  These steps are important not only in ensuring continuous improvement but 
also ensuring the integrity of the whole framework. 
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Appendix A  
Project Description Form 
Project Description Form 
 
MSc Information Security 
 
One copy of this form (or a typed or computer-generated version) is to be completed by 
each project student and sent (by email) to the project supervisor by the end of the 
second semester at the latest. If the project supervisor is satisfied with the contents then 
they should sign the form for their own records and inform the student. The student should 
keep a copy of the final project description form. If the project starts to deviate significantly 
from the originally approved proposal then the student should discuss this with the project 
supervisor and, if necessary, complete a revised form. 
 
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE PROJECT CANDIDATE 
 
Name:  Kwok Keong, LEE 
 
Contact email address(es):  kwokkeong.lee@gmail.com 
 
Provisional Title of Project:   Management of Risks associated with Deprimeterisation  
 
1.  Statement of Objectives 
a. What do you intend to achieve? 
 
(1) To explain the concepts of deperimeterisation. 
(2) To analyse the operational setup and environment of a 
law enforcement agency and carry out risk analysis in its 
facing of the issues with deperimeterisation. 
(3) To propose practical solutions to manage the risks 
associated with deperimeterisation. 
 
b. Why have you chosen the proposed project? 
 
After attending a seminar on Deperimeterisation, it has 
become clear to the author that deperimeterisation is the 
current problem faced by all organisations.  The problem is 
especially acute in the author’s organisation (which is a 
law enforcement agency) where there exists sensitive data is 
to be kept confidential.  The author’s interest in the topic 
has greatly increased and it is hoped that some practical 
solutions (such as segregation of duties, clear policies, 
access rights to folders, workaround solutions using 
existing software, etc) could be proposed to help the 
organisation to manage the risks faced with 
Deperimeterisation. 
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2. Methods to be used  
a. How do you intend to achieve the objectives listed above? 
 
Here are basically the various sections of the project: 
(1) Introduction 
- this would be the introduction to the project 
(2) Deperimeterisation 
- this section will cover the literature review and 
detail concepts of deprimeterisation which include the 
background, the 15 commandments and the 
discussion/arguments on the topic 
(3) Operational setup and working environment of the Law 
Enforcement Agency 
- in this section, the general operational setup and 
working environment of a Law Enforcement Agency would 
be defined 
(4) Risk Analysis 
- a detailed risk analysis (by adopting an existing risk 
management methology) with respect to the problems 
faced with deprimeterisation will be carried out in 
this section 
- if necessary, the author would seek assistance from his 
organisation to better understand the existing 
safeguards/controls that are put in place 
(5) Recommended Solutions 
- the recommend solutions to manage risks associated to 
deperimeterisation will be given 
- if necessary, the author would seek assistance from his 
organisation to see how improvement could be made and 
further safeguards/controls could be put in place 
(6) Conclusions 
- this would be the conclusions of the project 
 
 
b. What is your strategy for getting started? 
 
To carry out a Literature Review and gain as much knowledge 
as possible on the concepts of Deprimeterisation.  The 
available resources include mainly the Internet, Journals 
and past MSc project reports. 
Then on, start to analyse the author’s organisation and 
define its structure, operations, etc. Help would be 
solicited from the author’s organisation, if necessary. 
Following that, the author would proceed to carry out risk 
analysis and finally recommend solutions to manage the risks. 
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3. The work plan 
Provide a rough schedule, showing any key milestones in the project. 
 
 
 
4. Additional comments 
Use this section to make extra comments on the proposal on matters not 
covered above (use extra space if necessary). Include details of any 
involvement of external organisations. 
 
The scope of the project would only involve the 
administrative systems of the law enforcement agency and 
would not include the operational and intelligence systems. 
Hence, the results of this project could possibly be also 
applicable to other organisations that uses IT in their day-
to-day operations. 
 
Where necessary, the author would solicit advices and help 
from the author’s organisation which is a law enforcement 
agency. 
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TO BE COMPLETED BY THE PROJECT SUPERVISOR 
 
I approve the attached project plan. 
 
 
Signed :   
   
Name :  Peter Wild 
 
Date :  6 Mar 2008 
 
 
 
